How Oracle v. Google Magnifies Google’s Android Antitrust Vulnerabilities
1 Oracle v. Google case + 1 EU Android Tying Case = 3
While the U.S. Oracle v. Google Java API copyright case that will recommence in public court this month has been completely independent of the EU Google-Android antitrust case, in sovereign jurisdiction, type of law, legal process, timetable and alleged offense, these two cases ultimately could have huge, much underappreciated implications for each other, because they are both about the same thing -- purposeful illegal actions that Google chose to do to extend its search-related dominance into mobile via Android.
Summary
In a nutshell, this piece explains why the sum of the Oracle v. Google and EU-Android antitrust cases is greater than the parts. Together they expose:
- A more complete Android dominance story: ill-gotten first-mover-advantage combined with cumulative ill-gotten tying network effects;
- An Android OS that isn’t really free or open source software, but practically a cross-subsidized, hybrid-open-proprietary, Android-Java OS that effectively fixes a predatory price of zero for a dominant mobile OS that now is known to have a material incremental cost -- a needed Java license; and
- A clear Google anticompetitive pattern of behavior of abusing different sorts of APIs that could help expand the EU-Android-tying case into potentially a broader Google monopolization case.
Brief Background
