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Submitted by Scott Cleland on Wed, 2011-10-26 11:34
The New York Times editorial "How to Fix the Wireless Market," is embarrassingly uninformed and totally ignores massive obvious evidence of vibrant American wireless competition.
The NYT's conclusion, that more wireless regulation is needed because of "insufficient competition," results from cherry picking a few isolated facts that superficially support their case, while totally ignoring the overwhelming relevant evidence to the contrary.
The NYT completely ignores widely-available evidence of vibrant wireless competition and substitution:
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Fri, 2011-10-21 16:32
For those seeking to better understand how communications competition has evolved, expanded, and accelerated to cloud communications competition, don't miss my new six-chart powerpoint presentation: "The Metamorphosis of Communications Competition," here.
My bottom line conclusion: The transformation of communications competition requires a transformation in communications law.
I presented this new easy-to-understand framework for understanding exploding communications competition at a NetCompetition event today on Capitol Hill, which also featured excellent presentations by Jeff Eisenach, Managing Director of Navigant Economics, and Ev Ehrlich, President of ESC Company.
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Tue, 2011-10-11 13:43
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Thu, 2011-10-06 18:16
Since the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was selected to hear appeals of the FCC's Open Internet Order -- it is now even more likely that the FCC's net neutrality regulations will be overturned in court as unlawful and/or unconstitutional.
The D.C. Circuit is the Appeals Court that traditionally hears cases involving independent regulatory agencies like the FCC, so the D.C. Circuit Judges are very familiar with both the limits of the FCC's statutory authority and the FCC's proven penchant for trying to overreach their statutory authority.
In a nutshell, the FCC's legal case stands on two very slippery assumptions.
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Fri, 2011-09-30 18:19
See my Forbes Tech Capitalist post here "Why Verizon Wins Appeal of FCC's Net Regs."
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Wed, 2011-09-28 19:00
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Fri, 2011-09-16 12:01
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Mon, 2011-09-05 13:59
The broader evidence of competitive price pressure in the U.S. mobile marketplace that the DOJ has ignored and excluded in its gerrymandered market definition -- is the DOJ case's Achilles Heel.
While layman may not understand that the DOJ's HHI concentration indices are not determinative, this experienced Judge certainly does.
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Wed, 2011-08-03 12:40
FreePress with its "all complaints all the time" approach to advocacy has been caught once again "crying wolf" when there was no real problem or threat.
FreePress also continues to cry wolf about its spurious tethering" complaint against Verizon because users are prevented from unauthorized tethering of additional devices trying to bypass users' terms of service agreement.
Submitted by Scott Cleland on Mon, 2011-08-01 15:25
In the end, the U.S. Government is highly-likely to approve the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, despite the significant opposition, because of three over-riding realities: 1) market/financial realities, 2)DOJ legal/precedent realities, and 3) FCC public-interest realities.
I. Market Reality:
T-Mobile's leadership and owners have decided that they are unable and unwilling to invest what is necessary in order to compete going forward in the American 4G wireless market, and given that fundamental premise, the AT&T/T-Mobile merger is the optimal market outcome for T-Mobile's customers and for competition.
So the key baseline fact grounding the DOJ/FCC's decision processes here, is that T-Mobile's leaders/funders are effectively exiting this business one way or another long term via merger, sale or benign neglect.